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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Can a Defense Attorney's Promise
Make a Guilty Plea Involuntary - Sanders v. State, 440 So.
2d 278 (Miss. 1983).
The Coahoma County Grand Jury indicted Sylvester Sanders
on two charges of aggravated assault. The indictment stemmed
from two shootings on January 8, 1981, in which Sanders shot
and seriously wounded two men. Sanders initially entered a plea
of not guilty, and the court appointed two attorneys to represent
him.
Sanders and his two attorneys appeared before the Circuit Court
of Coahoma County on August 11, 1981, where Sanders an-
nounced his wish to change his plea to guilty. A lengthy interro-
gation followed to determine that his plea was "knowingly,
understandingly, freely, and voluntarily [being] made." 1 The cir-
cuit court judge carefully inquired of Sanders whether he under-
stood the charge and possible sentencing, and Sanders indicated
to the court that he did and that no promises had been made to
him regarding sentencing.
Sanders was sentenced on August 12, 1981, to two consecu-
tive seventeen year sentences. On May 12, 1982, Sanders applied
for a writ of error coram nobis.2 In his supporting affidavit,'
Sanders alleged that he was induced to plead guilty by his attor-
neys' promise that he would receive two five-year sentences. He
further alleged that his attorneys told him to lie when the judge
asked if he had been promised anything if he pleaded guilty.
The circuit court, on June 22, 1982, denied Sanders' applica-
tion without a hearing. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.
BACKGROUND
As one author has said, "Plea bargaining is not only an invisi-
ble procedure but, in some jurisdictions, a theoretically unsanc-
tioned one. In order to satisfy the court record, a defendant, his
attorney, and the prosecutor will at the time of sentencing often
I. Sanders v. State, 440 So. 2d 278, 281 (Miss. 1983).
2. MIss. CODE ANN.§ 99-35-145 (1972) recognizes by statute the writ of error coram nobis and provides
for a hearing on the petition after leave to file has been granted. The court treated the petition as a writ of
habeas corpus under Rule 8.08 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice, which
provides for post-conviction relief through petition.
3. "Petitioner states that his attorney persuaded him to enter a plea of guilty, to two (2) counts of aggravat-
ed assault by promising him that he would receive two (2) five (5) year sentences; rather than face the threat
of two (2) forty year sentences, if he did not plead guilty." Sanders, 440 So. 2d at 283.
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ritually state to a judge that no bargain has been made."' Even
where the practice is sanctioned, judges often view it with suspi-
cion. For many busy defense attorneys, persuading an indigent
defendant to plead guilty allows the attorney to collect his fee with
a minimum amount of effort. According to Percy Foreman:
[T]he 'optimum situation' for an economically motivated lawyer would be to take one highly
publicized case to trial each year and then to enter guilty pleas in all the rest. 'One never
makes much money on the cases one tries,' Foreman explained, 'but they help to bring
in the cases one can settle.' '
Since abuse of plea bargaining is inherent in the criminal justice
system, criminal appeals often aim at withdrawing or vacating
a previously rendered plea of guilty. Where there is evidence that
the parties agreed on a plea bargain that was not kept, courts have
generally allowed the prisoner to withdraw his guilty plea.6 The
theory underlying this willingness to allow withdrawal involves
more than just a contractual approach of giving the prisoner "the
benefit of his bargain" 7 but relies also on the idea that a guilty
plea must be entered voluntarily.8 As one court declared, "A guilty
plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the
character of a voluntary act, is void.""
Relief from conviction by overturning a guilty plea is not easily
obtained. The prisoner bears a heavy burden in proving the ex-
istence of his reasonable belief in a plea bargain. He must prove:
"1) exactly what the terms of the alleged promise were; 2) exactly
when, where, and by whom such a promise was made; and 3)
the precise identity of an eye witness to the promise.""0
In many cases, however, there is neither an actual plea bargain
nor reasonable evidence that would lead the defendant to believe
a plea bargain existed.1 He may be induced to plead guilty in
4. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES, 758 (3d ed. 1975).
5. Alschuler, The Defense Attoineys Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182 (1975).
6. The cases may be divided into two areas: I) where an actual plea bargain existed, but was not kept;
and 2) where there was evidence, which the prisoner reasonably believed, to suggest a plea bargain. Cases
under the first category include: Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (guilty plea withdrawn); Un-
derwood v. Blackburn, 563 F. Supp. 273 (M.D. La. 1983) (guilty plea withdrawn). Cases under the second
category include: Marchibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) (guilty plea withdrawn); Hayes v. Mag-
gio, 699 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1983) (guilty plea withdrawn); United States v. Ammirato, 670 F.2d 552 (5th
Cir. 1982) (relief denied) (the transcript showed clearly that there was no plea bargain); Chavez v. Wilson,
417 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1969) (guilty plea withdrawn).
7. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
8. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), held that, because the defendant gives up important constitu-
tional rights by pleading guilty, his plea must be voluntary.
9. Marchibroda, 368 U.S. at 493.
10. Hayes v. Maggio, 699 F.2d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Blackledge v. Allisson, 431 U.S. 63,
76 (1977)).
It. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984); Allen v. State, 465 So. 2d 1088 (Miss. 1985).
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a variety of other contexts, some of which may render his plea
involuntary. The Supreme Court articulated a standard to deter-
mine whether a plea was voluntary that "suggests that only a broken
promise, a factual misrepresentation, a threat to do something il-
legal if the defendant refuses to plead guilty, or a promise to
discontinue an illegal action if he does plead guilty can make a
resulting guilty plea involuntary." 12 An unkept plea bargain clearly
falls into the category of a broken promise. Increasingly, prisoners
have called upon the courts to determine what other actions of
their attorneys will render a guilty plea involuntary.
In light of the holding in Boykin v. Alabama,"3 that voluntariness
is an essential element of a guilty plea, courts have become in-
creasingly careful to observe strict procedures for accepting such
pleas. The American Bar Association has drafted standards for
accepting a guilty plea1 ' that were designed so that "a defendant
will be hard put to demonstrate, by the requisite clear and con-
vincing evidence, that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest
injustice if the court to which he pleaded scrupulously followed
the standards governing the manner in which a plea should be
examined prior to acceptance."" Nevertheless, many courts do
not follow these standards, and even in the courts that do follow
them, guilty pleas are often later attacked for a variety of reasons.
Among these reasons are: a temporary mental disturbance of
the defendant; the inability of the defense attorney to render ef-
fective counsel; and a promise made by the defense attorney
regarding sentencing. Courts have made short shrift of claims of
temporary mental disturbances resulting from poor physical
condition16 or fear,17 holding that post-conviction relief should not
be granted in such cases. The other two areas (effectiveness of
counsel and promises by counsel) have been more difficult to
resolve.
In 1970, the Supreme Court decided a trio of cases that "shifted
the central issue in guilty plea litigation from voluntariness to the
effective assistance of counsel." " The cases, Brady v. United
States, 9 McMann v. Richardson,20 and Parker v. North Carolina2
12. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The Defense Attorney, and The Guilty Plea, 47 CoLO. L. REV. 1, 59
(quoting from Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)).
13. 395 U.S. at 238.
14. STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1968).
15. Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 128 (1977).
16. Moya v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1983).
17. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
18. Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1180.
19. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
20. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
21. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
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have become known as the "Brady trilogy.""2 These cases all in-
volved prisoners who alleged that their attorneys made a mistake
of law in advising them to plead guilty. In Brady,2" the prisoner
alleged that his plea was made to avoid the death sentence then
imposed on kidnappers who did not release their victims un-
harmed. Since a later case invalidated the death penalty for such
offenses, the prisoner claimed that his attorney erred in not an-
ticipating the change in law. In McMann"' and Parker,2" the
prisoners alleged that their attorneys erred in misjudging the ad-
missibility of coerced confessions. In all three cases, the court
refused to grant relief, holding that effectiveness of counsel was
not an issue upon which a guilty plea may be withdrawn.
The general rule of the Brady trilogy has been modified in re-
cent cases in state courts where the attorney's mistake of law has
gone to the conditions of the defendant's sentence. In State v.
Galliano," the defendant was allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
after his attorney, the trial judge, and the prosecutor told him he
would be ordered to undergo a psychiatric exam and given a
suspended sentence. In fact, a three-year sentence was mandatory.
In People v. Owsley," the defense attorney misrepresented parole
conditions to the defendant. And, finally, in Hill v. State, 8 the
Mississippi Supreme Court allowed an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether a guilty plea should be vacated after the trial
court erred in informing the defendant of the number of years
he would have to serve. Thus, where the prisoner maintains that
his attorney's ineffectiveness induced his guilty plea, he must show
a material misrepresentation regarding sentencing in order to get
post-conviction relief. In contrast, where the claim is based sole-
ly on inexperience or lack of knowledge of the attorney, the plea
will stand. 9
Cases involving a guilty plea given in reliance on a promise from
the defense attorney are, in terms of precedent, the most confus-
ing. These cases typically concern a statement by the attorney to
the effect that, by pleading guilty, the defendant will reduce his
possible sentence. Where this statement merely reflects an er-
roneous estimate on the part of the attorney or a mistaken im-
22. Alschuler, supra note 12, at 1180.
23. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
24. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
25. 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
26. 396 So. 2d 1288 (La. 1981).
27. 66 Ill. App. 3d 234, 383 N.E.2d 271 (1978).
28. 388 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 1980).
29. In United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963), the defendant pleaded guilty to a "technical
violation" of the Mann Act on the advice of his lawyer, and was not allowed to later withdraw it.
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pression that the judge has promised a lighter sentence, the plea
will not be set aside as involuntary."0 However, where the attorney
promises a specific sentence and leads the defendant to believe
that he is assured of receiving it, he opens the guilty plea up to
an attack based on voluntariness.
After the Boykin decision, the standard for voluntariness was
that the transcript clearly reflect it."1 However, in many instances
there is not an adequate record of the pre-sentencing hearings.
Furthermore, even when there are extensive records, a prisoner
may allege that he lied to the trial judge regarding the voluntariness
of his plea, so that the record is not adequate. These two situa-
tions present significant problems in ruling on a previously given
plea of guilty, and will be dealt with separately.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in Sanders, relied heavily on
the case of Blackledge v. Allison, 2 to support its proposition that
collateral attacks on guilty pleas should be allowed."3 The prisoner
in Blackledge had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the
grounds that his attorney told him, presumably after consulting
with the trial judge and the prosecutor, that he would get a ten-
year sentence for attempted bank robbery. His attorney also
allegedly told him to lie to the court when he was asked whether
any promises were made, in order that the court would accept
his plea. At the hearing where the prisoner entered his plea, the
judge read thirteen questions from a printed form," which the
prisoner then signed. The form indicated that no promise had in-
duced him to plead guilty. The record did not show whether any
other questioning of the prisoner or his attorneys took place, nor
was there a record of the arraignment proceeding or the sentenc-
ing hearing. The trial judge sentenced the prisoner to seventeen
30. Mosher v. Lavallee, 491 F.2d 1346 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
31. 395 U.S. at 238.
32. 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
33. 440 So. 2d at 285.
34. The pertinent questions were:
8. Do you understand that upon your plea of guilty you could be imprisoned for as much as a mini-
mum of 10 years to life?
Answer: Yes.
10. Have you had time to talk and confer with and have you conferred with your lawyer about this
case, and are you satisfied with his services?
Answer: Yes.
II. Has the Solicitor, or your lawyer, or any policeman, law officer, or anyone else made any threat
to you to influence you to plead guilty in this case?
Answer: No.
12. Do you now freely, understandingly, and voluntarily authorize and instruct your lawyer to enter
on your behalf a plea of guilty?
Answer: Yes.
Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 66, n.I.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
to twenty-one years. In affirming the court of appeals' order for
an evidentiary hearing, the Supreme Court stated that:
[T]he federal courts cannot fairly adopt a per se rule excluding all possibility that a defen-
dant's representations at the time his guilty plea was accepted were so much the product
of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation by others as to make
the guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment."
The Court in Blackledge considered two factors in determin-
ing whether the prisoner had raised "contentions that in the face
of the record are wholly incredible." 3 First, the prisoner sub-
mitted a petition which "indicated exactly what the terms of the
promise were; when, where, and by whom the promise had been
made; and the identity of one witness to its communication." 37
Second, in the absence of adequate records of the proceedings,
the prisoner could reasonably have believed that the plea bargain
was a part of the process which must remain concealed. Therefore,
this case held that where the prisoner makes a plausible claim in
his petition that is not refuted by the record, an evidentiary hear-
ing must be held to determine whether the guilty plea was entered
voluntarily.
Similarly, in the case of Williams v. Estelle, 8 the Fifth Circuit
held that a prisoner's claim of a promise of a light sentence and
early parole was not without merit. The prisoner alleged that the
court did not warn him that his sentence could be greater. "In view
of the absence of a transcript of the hearing at which Williams'
guilty plea was accepted, and the confused nature of the subse-
quent state habeas corpus proceedings, we conclude that Williams'
claims.., should not have been dismissed by the district court." 39
In order to determine that guilty pleas are given voluntarily,
trial courts have developed exhaustive questioning of defendants
who plead guilty. However, even a complete and accurate trial
record that indicates understanding and voluntariness may be at-
tacked. Where the prisoner claims that he made false statements
to the trial judge regarding his voluntariness, he bears the burden
of coming forward with evidence to support his claim. In one case,
where the prisoner's attorney testified that no promise had been
made, and the prisoner produced a witness who testified that there
had been a promise, relief was denied."0 The court held that
"[w]here, from the transcript, the plea-taking proceedings are clear
35. Id. at 75.
36. Id. at 74.
37. Id. at 76.
38. 681 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1982).
39. Id. at 948.
40. Barnes v. United States, 579 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1978).
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and regular on their face, a petitioner asserting the existence of
a bargain outside the record and contrary to his own statements
under oath bears a heavy burden."' In another case, where the
defense attorney and several witnesses testified that a promise had
been made, the courts granted relief.4 ' The court there held that
"[i]f the defendant's belief that he will receive leniency is induced
by an erroneous sentence estimate made by defense counsel, his
plea is not involuntary and will not be set aside." 3
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in Sanders, also relied on the
Missouri case of Burgin v. State" to support its granting of the
evidentiary hearing." However, Missouri courts provide an ex-
ample which is contrary to the holding of Sanders, showing how
the process for accepting a guilty plea may evolve as the result
of post-conviction attacks on voluntariness. In Burgin, the court
granted an evidentiary hearing on a motion to vacate a sentence
imposed after a guilty plea. The prisoner alleged that his attorney
had promised him a shorter sentence than the one actually im-
posed and told him to lie to the trial judge when asked if any pro-
mises had been made. The court held that the lie destroyed the
purpose of the judge's inquiry, in that:
The question by the trial judge relating to a 'promise' is intended to determine that the
plea is not 'involuntary' in the sense that a 'promise' by anyone other than the judge is
not binding on the court and that the defendant is not misled by a 'promise' of a certain
sentence not within the power of the promissor to perform."
This case supports the opinion of Sanders that a collateral attack
on a guilty plea can be made by any prisoner who alleges that
he was promised a light sentence and lied to the trial judge. The
crux of the decision is that a guilty plea made upon the promise
of a defense attorney is not voluntary, in that the promise itself
is illusory. At the time he enters his guilty plea, the defendant
generally has no way of knowing that his attorney's promise can-
not be enforced, and it is this lack of understanding which makes
his plea involuntary.
However, the holding of Burgin was limited in the subsequent
Missouri case of Mainord v. State. 7 There, the judge specifical-
ly told the defendant that any deals previously made were no longer
41. id. at 366.
42. Mosher v. Lavallee, 351 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 491 F.2d 1346 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
43. 351 F. Supp. at 1108.
44. 522 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. App. 1975).
45. 440 So. 2d at 286.
46. Burgin v. State, 522 S.W.2d at 160.
47. 541 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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effective. After receiving concurrent sentences of eight and five
years, the prisoner moved to vacate the sentence on the grounds
that his attorney told him he would receive a five-year sentence.
The court distinguished Burgin on the grounds that this language
"suggests that the trial judge did not clearly inform the defendant
that any promises made were not binding on the trial court." 8
In successive cases, the Missouri courts further refined the pro-
cedure for examining post-conviction attacks on guilty pleas. In
Beaver v. State, "9 the prisoner alleged that his attorney promised
him concurrent sentences when, in fact, he received consecutive
sentences. The court denied relief, pointing to the fact that his
allegation was refuted by the showing in the record that the court
made it clear that the choice of sentences rested with the court.
Likewise, in Dickerson v. State,"0 the prisoner alleged that his
attorney told him that he would receive the recommended sentence,
which was significantly lower than the sentence imposed.
However, the court made it clear to the prisoner that the recom-
mended sentence was not binding, so relief was denied. Finally,
in Roebuck v. State,s" the prisoner moved to vacate his sentence
on the ground that he lied when asked if he had been promised
probation. The court denied the motion, holding that the allega-
tions "were clearly refuted by the record." " Examining the record
of the guilty plea, the court held:
The question of promises of any kind, particularly of probation were exhaustively covered
by the trial court. It confronted movant with the question of whether he had been advised
to lie to the court. It made a painstaking effort to insure movant's plea was voluntarily
and knowingly entered. It gave movant an opportunity to change his mind about his in-
dicated desire to plead guilty."
Given the precedent set by the aforementioned cases, the state
of the law regarding post-conviction attacks on guilty pleas may
be summarized as follows:
1) Boykin requires that a guilty plea be given voluntarily and
that voluntariness must be indicated by the transcript."4
2) An actual plea bargain that is not kept will render a guilty
plea involuntary.5
48. Id. at 781.
49. 522 S.W.2d 36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
50. 594 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
51. 607 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
52. Id. at 873.
53. Id.
54. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 238-44.
55. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 257.
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3) A reasonable belief that an actual plea bargain was made will
render a guilty plea involuntary. 6
4) Mental disturbances of the defendant 7 or the defense at-
torney's mistake of law 8 will not render a guilty plea involun-
tary, although a material error regarding sentencing will.5
5) Where the record is silent as to the possibility of a plea
bargain, one may be imputed by the courts.6"
6 )Where the record clearly shows an exhaustive examination
of the defendant which disclaims any previous bargains, at
least one state court has held that the guilty plea is voluntary."'
INSTANT CASE
The Mississippi Supreme Court relied primarily on Blackledge
v. Allison in holding that Sanders' allegations entitled him to an
evidentiary hearing. As the court interpreted Blackledge and its
progeny,62 Sanders' allegations mandated an evidentiary hearing
to determine the voluntariness of his plea, if those allegations did
not contradict the record. Since Sanders alleged that he lied to
the trial court, his affidavit was not contrary to the record. Thus,
the court held that when a prisoner maintains that his attorney
convinced him to plead guilty on the unkept promise of a lesser
sentence, and the prisoner lies during the plea hearing, then he
may later attack the guilty plea on the grounds of involuntariness.
The allegations of Sanders presented a case of first impression
for the Mississippi Supreme Court. However, in deciding the issue
of whether an evidentiary hearing was required in this case, the
court reviewed several prior Mississippi decisions. Notable among
these decisions were Thornhill v. State,"3 Kennard v. State," Dunn
v. Reed,6" Baker v. State," and Phillips v. State.67
In Thornhill,68 the court granted a writ of error coram nobis
56. Marchibroda, 368 U.S. at 487.
57. Alford, 400 U.S. at 25.
58. Brady, 397 U.S. at 742.
59. Hill, 388 So. 2d at 143.
60. Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 63.
61. Roebuck, 607 S.W.2d at 872.
62. The court cited Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977), for the proposition that a per se rule disal-
lowing collateral attack on a guilty plea was improper. The line of cases used to support this reasoning includ-
ed: Moser v. Lavallee, 491 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974); Chavez v. Wilson,
417 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1974); People v. Owsley, 66 1. App. 3d 234, 383 N.E.2d 271 (1978); State v. Gal-
liano, 396 So. 2d 1288 (La. 1981); Baker v. State, 358 So. 2d 401 (Miss, 1978); Burgin v. State, 522 S.W.2d
159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
63. 246 Miss. 312, 149 So. 2d 27 (1963).
64. 246 Miss. 209, 148 So. 2d 660 (1963).
65. 309 So. 2d 516 (Miss. 1975).
66. 358 So. 2d 401 (Miss. 1978).
67. 421 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1982).
68. 246 Miss. at 312, 149 So. 2d at 27.
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to review a plea of guilty to homicide. The trial record in that
case clearly showed evidence of inadequate counsel, in that the
trial judge made a promise of leniency. Kennard also involved
the granting of a writ of error coram nobis where the averred facts
were not in the record." The case gave a standard for a petition
for a writ of error coram nobis, holding that it should be sustained
only where "the newly discovered evidence is of such a nature
that it would be practically conclusive that it would cause a differ-
ent result .... [I]t will not be sustained if the newly discovered
evidence merely tends to impeach other testimony offered at the
trial ... ." 7 In Dunn, the prisoner alleged that he pleaded guilty
to manslaughter and arson because he was told he would receive
the death penalty, he was suffering from a mental disorder, and
he misunderstood the parole procedure. Although the writ was
denied on jurisdictional grounds, the court held that the allega-
tions, if true, would require issuance.71 These three cases may
be analogized to cases cited earlier in this article regarding unkept
plea bargains and material errors regarding sentencing.72
In Baker, the prisoners asked the court to vacate their guilty
pleas on the grounds that duress and the threat of facing capital
punishment made their pleas involuntary.73 The trial judge had
questioned the prisoners as to whether their pleas were volun-
tary, and they had answered in the affirmative. The supreme court
recognized that Blackledge held that a collateral attack on a plea
of guilty could not be denied just because the transcript "reflects
recitation of voluntariness and awareness of the consequence." "'
However, the court also recognized the heavy burden that the
prisoner has of proving the reasonable probability of his allega-
tions. Where the court must choose between sworn statements
made in court and a petition, "the petition fails to rise to the level
of a reasonable probability .... " ' Baker is also important because
it sets out the requirements for a petition for a writ of error cor-
am nobis, which are:
1) Specifically and separately enumerate those facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner.
2) Those facts must be sworn to on personal knowledge by the petitioner.
69. 246 Miss. at 209, 148 So. 2d at 660.
70. Id. at 212, 148 So. 2d at 661.
71. 309 So. 2d at 516.
72. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 257.
73. 358 So. 2d at 401.
74. Id. at 403.
75. Id.
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3) For any facts alleged not within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, the petition
must state how or by whom these facts will be proven and include the affidavit of the
witness who will so testify.
4) Finally, the above (affidavits of other persons) may be excused upon good cause shown,
however, the petition must set out in detail for consideration by the court the alleged
'good cause." 6
These requirements indicate that any allegations of the petition
that contradict the record may require corroborating testimony.
The prisoner requesting review of his guilty plea in Phillips
has been sentenced under the habitual offender statute due to a
guilty plea previously made in Kentucky. 7 He challenged the sen-
tence on the ground that his previous plea was involuntary. The
court denied his petition, saying:
Although no longer may it be presumed from a silent record that a determination of the
voluntariness of the guilty plea was made, from an affirmative showing of such on the
face of the conviction, it must be presumed for the purpose of sentencing under the habitual
offender statute that such guilty plea was constitutionally sufficient.'"
Thus, the state of the law in Mississippi regarding the with-
drawal of a guilty plea before Sanders can be summarized as
follows:
1) A plea was considered involuntary if induced by an unkept
plea bargain79 or a material mistake regarding sentencing."0
2) A petition for a writ of error coram nobis should include
corroborating testimony to overcome the presumption of ac-
curacy of the record."'
3) Where the record of the conviction makes an affirmative
showing of voluntariness, the court will presume that the plea
was constitutionally sufficient."2
Sanders represents a complete break in Mississippi law regard-
ing the withdrawal of guilty pleas through the use of a writ of
error coram nobis. Furthermore, the court in Sanders chose to
apply a Missouri precedent which has been explicitly distinguished
in a factual situation similar to Sanders. At issue is whether the
court intended to change the law regarding the withdrawal of guilty
pleas in Mississippi, or whether the case indicates a return to the
days when guilty pleas were generally distrusted by the courts.
76. Id. at 404.
77. 421 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1982).
78. Id. at 483.
79. Thornhill v. State, 246 Miss. 312, 149 So. 2d 27 (1963).
80. Dunn v. Reed, 309 So. 2d 516 (Miss. 1975).
81. Baker v. State, 358 So. 2d 401 (Miss. 1978).
82. Phillips v. State, 421 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1982).
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RATIONALE OF COURT
The record in Sanders shows that the trial judge made a lengthy
and exhaustive examination of the defendant. He repeatedly asked
the defendant whether anyone had promised him any particular
sentence, that the court was not bound by any other agreements,
and gave the defendant an opportunity to change his plea. Sanders
affirmed that his plea was entered voluntarily and without any
promise from his attorneys. There is no evidence from the record
to indicate that Sanders believed that a plea bargain existed that
required him to maintain his silence. Furthermore, there is no
indication that Sanders offered testimony from any third parties
that he was promised a lighter sentence. Allowing Sanders the
opportunity to offer evidence at a hearing which would contradict
the record is contrary to the holding of Baker that a petition for
a writ of error coram nobis must contain affidavits from third par-
ties that they will offer such evidence or must show good cause
why such evidence cannot be presented.83 Sanders did not over-
come, in his petition, the presumption of accuracy of the record.
Assuming, then, that the record is accurate, it reflects a full
understanding and awareness of the consequences of the guilty
plea. The court held that Sanders' allegations lie outside the record,
and, therefore, do not contradict it. In reaching that conclusion,
the court applied both Blackledge and Burgin. However, both of
those cases dealt with records which were inadequate. In
Blackledge, no transcript of the hearing was available,8" and in
Burgin, the record indicated that the judge had given the defen-
dant inadequate information.8" By comparison, the transcript of
the sentencing hearing of Sanders showed clearly that he was made
fully aware of all of the ramifications of his guilty plea. Further-
more, and unlike Burgin, Sanders was told that the choice of
sentences rested with the court and that no promises outside the
court were enforceable. In light of the record in this case, the
defendant did not overcome the presumption that his guilty plea,
as reflected by the record, was made knowingly, understanding-
ly, and voluntarily.
Furthermore, in its instructions to the circuit court on the sub-
ject of the evidentiary hearing, the supreme court admonished the
court to consider "all evidence tending to reveal the state of mind
of Sylvester Sanders at the time each plea was actually tendered.
83. Baker v. State, 358 So. 2d 401 (Miss. 1978).
84. Blackledege v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977).
85. Burgin v. State, 522 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
86. Sanders, 440 So. 2d at 288.
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This evidence was to include Sanders' general level of sophistica-
tion and ability to understand the consequences of his plea, the
counsel he received from his attorneys, and the interrogation of
the court.8 The opinion went further to state that "[tihe
thoroughness with which Sanders was interrogated by the circuit
court at the time the plea was tendered may well be the most im-
portant evidence of all.""' Recognizing that the determination of
the voluntariness of the plea necessarily involved a determina-
tion of the state of mind of the defendant, the court left to the
discretion of the circuit court judge the evaluation and balancing
of the relevant factors."' Thus, the circuit court judge will have
discretion at the evidentiary hearing to consider the same evidence
that was available to him at the sentencing hearing; i.e., the
responses to the interrogation to determine voluntariness of the
guilty plea.
This case seems to indicate a reluctance on the part of the
Mississippi Supreme Court to accept assertions made by the defen-
dant at the sentencing hearing, although those same assertions may
be determinative at the evidentiary hearing. The reluctance may
stem from a distaste of the plea bargaining system, as it exists
today in an atmosphere of secrecy and silence, rather than an open
forum in which bargains are struck between the defendant and
the judge who will ultimately sentence him. Justice Robertson in-
dicated as much in his opinion when he observed that "[a]ny ra-
tional defendant is going to rely heavily upon his lawyer's advice
as to how he should respond to the trial judge's questions at the
plea hearing . . . .Yet it is the defendant, not the lawyer, who
enters the plea ...[and] ...who is going to serve the time."9"
In a perfect system, where the defendant and the judge bargained
for the sentence to be imposed in open court, the specter of unkept
promises would be laid to rest.
CONCLUSION
This case represents an important trend in criminal law in that
it is a liberal interpretation of the principles, articulated in
Blackledge, for withdrawing a guilty plea. The holding in Sanders
allows any prisoner who has pleaded guilty to later claim that he
was promised a lighter sentence and was told to lie to the trial
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attack on a guilty plea, since the defendant's state of mind cannot
be made part of the record. Sanders allows the subsequent allega-
tions of the prisoner to refute the record as to voluntariness of
his guilty plea. The effect of this case will be to make state judges
even more reluctant to accept a plea of guilty.
Terryl Rushing
